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Abstract 
 
The televising and/or any other form of broadcasting of judicial 
hearings and of criminal trials in particular is a controversial topic 
that has not only provoked debate and been argued about by 
academics, the media and the public for years, but continues to 
be argued about with few signs of abatement. Until recently 
South Africa had largely escaped becoming embroiled in this 
provocative topic, as the live broadcasting of criminal trials from 
South African courtrooms did not occur. The situation has 
changed, though, following the recent live televising of a full 
criminal trial – namely, the trial of South African Para-Olympic 
champion Oscar Pistorius. Given that this trial signalled South 
Africa's debut into the world of the live televising of criminal trial 
proceedings, the question is asked why exactly South Africa 
ventured into this contentious legal territory. 
It must be emphasised that the intention of this contribution is 
solely to explore the court's consideration of the constitutional 
mandates and rights that were contained in both the application 
and the opposing arguments pertaining to the live broadcast the 
trial of Oscar Pistorius. This note will not attempt to examine or 
even approach the far greater question of whether criminal trials 
should be televised or not, a topic better left to future research. 
Keywords 
Oscar Pistorius; criminal trial; television broadcasting; 
constitutional rights; public interest; administration of justice; 
freedom of the press; fair trial. 
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1 Introduction 
Following the tragic and untimely death of twenty-nine year old model 
Reeva Steenkamp on the night of the 14th February 2013, her then 
boyfriend, South African Para-Olympic champion Oscar Pistorius1, was 
charged with her premeditated murder – the initiation of a criminal process 
that precipitated a media frenzy previously unknown in South Africa and one 
that launched a new legal era in the country. As was both predictable and 
inevitable, however, that furore has now receded from the media headlines, 
creating an opportune time to examine why the trial of Oscar Pistorius was 
in fact televised.2 It was after all the first, and to date the only, fully "live"3 
televised criminal trial in South Africa's judicial history.4 Not only was it 
unique as a milestone, but in addition the application to televise and widely 
broadcast the trial was also judicially decided under consideration of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter Constitution), 
thus setting a precedent for both the public and the media's constitutional 
rights of technological access to criminal trials in the future. 
2 The application 
The legal process which culminated in the broadcasting of the Pistorius trial 
had its genesis in an application brought before the Judge President of the 
Gauteng Division of the High Court.5 Unlike countries such as the United 
States of America, South Africa had historically experienced a lower 
demand for the televising of criminal trials (or even other judicial hearings), 
perhaps because commercial television became available in the country 
only in 1976 and, except for paid services, still today has only a limited 
number of channels.6 Further contributory factors may possibly be the lack 
of general access by the populace to technological media and/or the lack of 
                                            
* Amanda James. LLB (cum laude), LLM (cum laude), Advocate of the High Court of 
South Africa. Email: amanda5806@zoho.com. 
1  S v Pistorius 2014 ZAGPPHC 793 (12 September 2014). 
2  S v Pistorius 2014 ZAGPPHC 793 (12 September 2014). 
3  The term "live" is used signify that an event can be watched as it occurs. This is 
sometimes also referred to as "real-time". 
4  At the time of writing, the live televising of the murder trial of van Breda has been 
halted. 
5  Multichoice (Pty) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re; S v Pistorius, In Re; 
Media 24 Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng 2014 1 SACR 589 
(GP) (hereafter Application case). 
6  Primarily SABC 1, 2, 3 & e-TV. Other major international channels are available via 
paid subscription. 
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a wide-spread sophisticated audience.7 Notwithstanding these possible 
obstacles, the news channels eNCA, MultiChoice and Eyewitness News still 
submitted motions to court seeking permission to electronically monitor and 
broadcast the coming Pistorius trial, not only by audio transmission and still 
photographic means, but also by full live television broadcast.8 
To support their motion the applicants jointly argued, in the main, that the 
Constitution guaranteed them the right to freedom of expression.9 
Supplementing this major contention were their submissions that the 
television and audio broadcasting of the trial would provide educational 
benefit to the general public about the workings of South Africa's justice 
system, that the general public had the right to information, that such 
proposed coverage was in accordance with the "open justice" principle and, 
finally, that the trial was a matter of intense public interest.10 
Pistorius vehemently opposed the application, claiming that any such media 
coverage would deny him his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial.11 
The Olympic champion supported his opposition by submitting that the mere 
knowledge of the presence of audio-visual equipment (especially cameras) 
would inhibit not only him but would also inhibit his witnesses, particularly 
when they were called upon to give evidence. In addition, Pistorius further 
contended that his Counsel could also be inhibited when they were 
questioning prosecution and defence witnesses and,12 most importantly, 
when they were presenting his defence to a criminal charge which carried 
the potential for a minimal incarceration of fifteen years.13 
In reinforcing his opposition to the technological coverage, Pistorius ardently 
emphasised to the court that live coverage of the trial would necessarily and 
inescapably provide pending trial witnesses with opportunities to fabricate 
and/or adapt their own upcoming testimony. This, he maintained, would be 
made possible simply because witnesses would be able to follow the live 
                                            
7  Stats SA 2011 http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf. 
The 2011 Census indicated only 25.8% of households have satellite television while 
64.8% have no access to the internet. 
8  Application case para 3. Various applicants represented both television and the print 
media and the court considered all the applications together to enable a consolidated 
order to be issued. 
9  Application case para 6. 
10  Application case para 4. 
11  Application case para 12. 
12  Application case para 12. 
13  Section 51(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 prescribes a 
minimum sentence of fifteen years' incarceration for a first offender found guilty of 
premeditated murder. 
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broadcasts on their own electronic devices and thus would have 
foreknowledge of what previous witnesses had already testified to during 
the trial, and/or alternatively, what evidence had already been presented in 
the courtroom.14 He contended that this factor alone would not only threaten 
his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial but, in addition, would also 
be prejudicial to the administration of justice in general.15 
Although not largely elucidated upon in the opposition, Pistorius' Counsel 
did also argue that witnesses, especially defence witnesses, might be 
reluctant to testify on camera, thus further jeopardising their client's right to 
a fair trial. The author submits that it is indeed reasonably foreseeable that 
witnesses might, in order to assist an accused, be prepared to offer private 
or unpleasant revelations to a limited number of people physically present 
in a courtroom (the historical and traditional situation when a trial is held in 
an open court)16 but may be very reluctant or even refuse to do so when 
they know those same revelations will become common knowledge of the 
greater public because their testimony, image and/or voice are being 
broadcast to millions.17 
Interestingly, a South African court had already refused the televising of a 
judicial hearing for very similar reasons, inter alia, in the Midi Television 
(Pty) Ltd v Downer18 case, where E-TV brought an application to televise 
the trial proceedings in the matter of S v Shaik.19 This was a very 
controversial and highly publicised case involving charges of fraud and 
                                            
14  Application case para 12. 
15  A fair trial is one component of the "rule of law" (Latin Omnes legum servi sumus ut 
liberi esse possumus) and the right to a fair trial has been espoused in legal literature 
and case law for centuries. Examples are, Æthelred Wantage Code 997 AD; Magna 
Carta 1297 c 9; Constitutions of Clarendon 1166; Constitution of the United States 
of America; Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789 (Fr); Re Bushell 
1670 124 ER 1006; Blackstone Laws of England; Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948); European Convention on Human Rights (1950); Melikan Trial in 
History Vol II; Mulholland and Pullan Trial in History Vol I; Petition of Right, 1628. 
16  DOFORSA Rule of Law 47: "The rule of law … general agreement that it requires 
that a person on trial be accused in open court; be given an opportunity of denying 
the charge and of defending himself and that he be given the choice of a Counsel. 
These rights are at all times assured by the South African Courts." Also see Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 152 "Except where otherwise expressly provided by this 
Act or any other law, criminal proceedings in any court shall take place in open 
court…" 
17  Counsel's concerns did apparently come to fruition. Anonymous 2014 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28207346: "Some [defence] witnesses 
refused to testify at the televised trial of Oscar Pistorius because of the publicity … 
They did not want their voices all over the world" Barry Roux SC was quoted as 
saying at the close of the defence case. 
18  Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Downer 2004 ZAKZHC 15 (12 October 2004). 
19  S v Shaik 2007 1 SACR 142 (D). 
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corruption against a wealthy Durban businessman, Mr Shabir Shaik, whose 
name was closely associated in the public's mind with that of a then former 
Deputy President and now the current President of South Africa, Mr Jacob 
Zuma. In considering the matter Squires J took pains to analyse all pertinent 
factors and in eventually refusing to grant the application to televise the trial 
stated:20 
The video camera may be the necessary tool of the television journalist but its 
visible presence, in this courtroom at any rate, would be undoubtedly a visible 
operation, with both its presence and its operation being conspicuously 
intrusive. To most people it would be a potentially distracting feature, even if 
they were not giving evidence. But I think the argument also overlooks an 
important difference between the fleeting moment of communication by word 
of mouth, given only as part of the normal narrative of evidence and given in 
answer to a question when, if spectators may be paying attention, what is said 
may be reported in print the next day but will soon be forgotten. Contrast that 
with a permanently-captured moment of inadvertent folly, embarrassment or 
humiliation that will appear time after time, if thought desirable, in the living 
rooms of the country's television watchers when every pause, every frown, 
every hesitation, every unguarded response or unavoidable disclosure of 
some private fact is preserved on tape or film for as long as thought desirable, 
and especially when that frown or hesitation is not part of the evidence or the 
reason for it; but is caused by the witness's realisation that he is being 
exposed to television scrutiny. No one but the witness could tell what the 
cause was. Nor would he waive or limit his right to privacy by being 
subpoenaed to give evidence in court.  
An issue aligned to the above concern of Squires J is that the fairness of a 
trial may also be jeopardised as a result of changes in human behaviour 
when they are aware that what they say or do is being heard or viewed by 
a large audience, even if such changes are unintended or even inadvertent. 
It has been advanced that witnesses may, when participating in a broadcast 
trial, especially one that is visually broadcast, fall prey to the temptation to 
embellish or distort their true testimony in order to appeal to or find favour 
with the audience.21 Doing so is obviously at the expense of the fulfilment 
of their moral and judicial obligation to "tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth so help me God".22 
3 Judgment 
At the outset of his consideration of the arguments presented the Judge 
President regarded the matter before him as being one where the media's 
                                            
20  Midi Television (Pty) Ltd v Downer 2004 ZAKZHC 15 (12 October 2004) paras 8-9. 
21  Smith 1997 Law & Psychol Rev 258. 
22  The traditional oath sworn in court and used to designate the absolute veracity of 
any statement subsequently made, see s 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977. 
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right to freedom of expression and the defendant's and the prosecution's 
right to a fair trial were "on a collision course" with each other.23 Given the 
context of the motion it is not apparent how the court arrived at the 
conclusion that the prosecution (in the form of the State) had a "right to a 
fair trial". Try as the author may, she can find no such embodied right 
belonging to the State, either in the Constitution, its forerunners or in legal 
precedent. That the prosecution does indeed have an obligation to facilitate 
a criminal trial that searches for the truth is beyond question, but whether 
that means that the State is entitled to a "fair trial" (as that term is commonly 
understood by the layman) is a question better argued as a separate matter. 
What is pertinent for this current contribution's purpose is the reason or 
reasons why the court foresaw a cataclysmic "collision course" for Pistorius 
and the media, especially given that South Africa's courts had touched upon 
similar issues previously. One of the first constitutional challenges to the 
refusal of public and media access to legal proceedings occurred, not in a 
commonly envisaged criminal trial per se, but in a military Court Martial.24 
In deciding the matter of Freedom of Expression Institute v President, 
Ordinary Court Martial25 Hlophe ADJP held that section 78(3) of the Military 
Discipline Code26 was unconstitutional to the extent that "it permits a 
convening authority to issue orders to close proceedings".27 Hlophe then 
ordered the President, Ordinary Court Martial to: 
Open the entire proceedings of the ordinary courts martial to the public 
including members of the media.28  
                                            
23  Application case para 1. "The matter brings into sharp focus the interface between 
the functioning of the criminal justice system on the one hand, and the quest by other 
media and the press to participate in that system on the other hand. This interface 
finds expression in a number of critical constitutional rights that are seemingly on a 
collision course with one another. These are the rights of an accused person and the 
prosecution to a fair trial on the one hand, and the freedom of expression rights of 
the media, as well as the open justice principle." 
24  A court-martial is a military court with legal authority to determine the guilt or 
innocence of members of the armed forces subject to military law, and, if guilty to 
decide punishment. 
25  Freedom of Expression Inst v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 1 SACR 353 
(C). 
26  The Military Discipline Code (MDC) is the First Schedule to the Defence Act 44 of 
1957. It is to be read complementarily to the Military Discipline Supplementary 
Measures Act 16 of 1999. 
27  Freedom of Expression Inst v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 1 SACR 353 
(C) para 369. 
28  Freedom of Expression Inst v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 1 SACR 353 
(C) para 369. It is submitted that this ruling contradicts the long-established practice 
of all courts-martial and may have been a slightly over-enthusiastic approach to 
interpreting South Africa's constitutional rights. Military law and procedure has 
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In 2000 a Cape court was faced with another challenge concerning media 
access to legal proceedings that did not constitute a criminal trial. This time 
it concerned the radio broadcasting and televising of an enquiry into cricket 
match fixing - the case of Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd v King.29 The 
enquiry's Chairperson had refused permission for the coverage, a ruling the 
majority of the potential witnesses had enthusiastically welcomed. After 
considering all the relevant factors the court held that a complete blanket 
ban on all forms of the media from the enquiry was not justified.30 
Consequently, the court held that the applicant could operate its radio 
broadcasting equipment during the enquiry proceedings, provided that no 
witness showed good cause why they should not do so.31 The order banning 
any televised recording or broadcasting of the enquiry was, nevertheless, 
promptly upheld.32 
A request to televise and broadcast actual trial proceedings (albeit a civil 
trial and not a criminal one) eventually came before a Cape court in SABC 
v Thatcher.33 After Van Zyl J conducted an extremely comprehensive and 
detailed analysis of local and international authority on the issue, which 
included inter alia authority in the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom,34 he granted very restricted coverage. In conducting his analysis 
the judge stated that:35  
In South Africa there is no legislative ban on televising or otherwise recording 
court proceedings, but a number of courts have, by virtue of their inherent 
power to regulate their own procedures, allowed their proceedings to be 
televised wholly or partially. This has been done routinely in the Constitutional 
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, and has recently enjoyed the attention 
of a number of divisions of the High Court. Cognisance must, of course, be 
taken of the statutory provisions dealt with above, in which regard it is clear 
that the applicant bears the responsibility of acting in the public interest, while 
taking into account the interests of justice. The court, on the other hand, must 
exercise its discretion to issue a just and equitable order while taking 
cognisance of its inherent power to regulate its own proceedings. This means, 
in the present context, that the right of privacy of the various parties to the 
application must be weighed up and balanced against the right of freedom of 
expression which, in the case of the media, translates into freedom of the 
press. An exercise of this nature must be undertaken with due regard to any 
                                            
always been treated differently in jurisdictions based on English common-law. Also 
see Jaconelli Open Justice 22-24; Ex p Doyle 1917 2 KB 254. 
29  Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd v King 2000 4 SA 973 (C). 
30  Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd v King 2000 4 SA 973 (C) para 61 991D-H. 
31  Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd v King 2000 4 SA 973 (C) para 63 991I-992A. 
32  Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd v King 2000 4 SA 973 (C) para 63 991I-992A. 
33  SABC v Thatcher 2005 4 All SA 353 (C). 
34  SABC v Thatcher 2005 4 All SA 353 (C) paras 51-109 both inclusive. 
35  SABC v Thatcher 2005 4 All SA 353 (C) para 31. 
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reasonable or justifiable limitation on the right or rights in question, as stated 
in the classic dictum of Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane:36 
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is 
reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the 
weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment 
based on proportionality.37 
The court considered the need to balance the right to privacy against the 
right to freedom of expression (which from the perspective of the press 
meant its freedom) and held that in all instances, the balance must be based 
on fairness and reasonableness.38 The author submits that Van Zyl J's full 
analysis is an excellent exposé of upholding the rationale of open justice, 
whilst simultaneously placing both the general public's and the media's 
interests into a correct relationship with that of a presumptively innocent 
accused. 
Two years later, in 2007, when hearing Midi Television Pty Ltd v Director of 
Public Prosecutions (WC),39 the Supreme Court of Appeal gave additional 
guidance on the approach a court should consider when called upon to 
balance opposing constitutional rights in matters concerning the 
broadcasting of court proceedings and held that competing rights:40 
… cannot be reconciled by purporting to weigh the value of one right against 
the value of the other and then preferring the right that is considered to be 
more valued. They are rather to be reconciled by recognising a limitation upon 
the exercise of one right to the extent that it is necessary to do so in order to 
accommodate the exercise of the other … according to what is required by 
the particular circumstances and within the constraints that are imposed by 
s36. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal had also had an opportunity to deal with a 
matter that contained almost identical arguments to those facing the Judge 
President in the Oscar matter, although the Supreme Court of Appeal had 
been considering a criminal appeal hearing and not a criminal trial per se. 
In SABC v Downer and Shaik41 the South African Broadcasting Company, 
as the national public broadcaster,42 applied to televise and sound-record a 
specific appeal hearing which it claimed possessed considerable public 
                                            
36  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
37  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104 436C. 
38  SABC v Thatcher 2005 4 All SA 353 (C) para 123. 
39  Midi Television Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 2007 5 SA 540 SCA. 
40  Midi Television Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WC) 2007 5 SA 540 SCA 
para 549. 
41  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA). 
42  Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999. 
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interest.43 The SABC argued that, in addition to supplying content for its 
news programmes, the televising of the appeal hearing would educate the 
general public about how South Africa's judiciary worked.44 The 
respondents in their opposition argued that the awareness of the live 
televising would not only continually distract their Counsel, but also risked 
disrupting the required expansive forensic presentation.45 They further 
contended that both these factors would cause prejudice and thus would 
inevitably threaten the provision of a fair hearing.46 
In deciding the matter, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that there was no 
general rule to balance the right to freedom of expression against the right 
to a fair trial, and in the event that any such balancing should actually be 
required, it would be unique to the peculiarities of each case under 
consideration.47 
Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court of Appeal readily agreed with the 
argument that for a litigant to be on camera does carry substantial stress 
which magnifies exponentially as the trial continues,48 it did still nevertheless 
hold that there could be certain specific instances when an individual court 
would be satisfied that justice would not be impaired. The current matter 
before the Supreme Court of Appeal was not, however, such an occasion.49 
When it was asked to consider if perhaps parts of the appeal hearing in 
question could be televised, the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that: 
It needs to be emphasised that delayed 'highlights' packages, which will most 
times contain 'sound bites', present a considerable risk of misrepresentation 
(even if unintended) and consequent misunderstanding.50 
When it came to the SABC's claim that the televising of the hearing would 
educate the public, the Supreme Court of Appeal unsurprisingly, but 
nevertheless astutely, held that although educating the public on South 
Africa's judicial system was indeed overdue: 
                                            
43  The appeal concerned Shabir Schaik's conviction on corruption and fraud charges. 
44  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 7. 
45  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 8. 
46  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 8. 
47  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 14. 
48  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 22. 
49  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 30. 
50  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 29. 
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…the motive [for the application] was in my view the perfectly understandable 
one of securing the commercial advantage of enhanced viewer- and 
listenership.51 
Not satisfied with the resultant negative ruling against them, the applicants 
speedily appealed to the Constitutional Court.52 They were to be 
disappointed. The Constitutional Court, in a majority ruling, agreed with the 
views of the Supreme Court of Appeal and pointed out the following aspects 
for courts to consider if and when they were faced with similar applications 
for the televising of judicial proceedings in the future: 
We consider it helpful to set out some considerations which in our view need 
to be taken into account in the future when the question of televising court 
proceedings is raised. The time has come for courts to embrace the principle 
of open justice and all it implies. However, in our view, it should be borne in 
mind that the electronic media create some special difficulties for the principle 
of open justice. Broadcasting, whether by television or radio, has the potential 
to distort the character of the proceedings. This can happen in two ways: first, 
by the intense impact that television, in particular, has on the viewer in 
comparison to the print media; and second, the potential for the editing of court 
proceedings to convey an inaccurate reflection of what actually happened. 
This is particularly dangerous given that visual and audio recordings can be 
edited in a manner that does not disclose the fact of editing. This distorting 
effect needs to be guarded against. It arises not so much from the presence 
of cameras and microphones interfering with the court proceedings 
themselves, but more dangerously, it may arise from the manner in which 
coverage can be manipulated, often unwittingly, to produce communications 
which may undermine rather than support public education on the workings of 
the court and may also undermine the fairness of the trial.53 
Although the Constitutional Court was referring to appeal hearings in the 
above quotation, the court did nevertheless very importantly take the 
opportunity to state that: 
Ordinarily, it will not be in the interests of justice for trial proceedings to be 
subjected to live broadcasts. (Emphasis added).54 
Given these judicial rulings and guidelines by the superior courts it is 
therefore unclear why the rights of the media and those of Pistorius were 
regarded by the Judge President as being on an imminent collision course.55 
This anticipated cataclysmic event notwithstanding, the Judge President 
proceeded to consider the applicant's claim that as Pistorius was an 
"international icon", the upcoming criminal trial was a matter of intense 
                                            
51  SABC v Downer and Shaik 2007 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para 30. 
52  SABC v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 (CC). 
53  SABC v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 (CC) para 68. 
54  SABC v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 (CC) para 33. 
55  Application case para 1. 
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public interest.56 In support of this finding, the court explained that the depth 
of the interest had already been clearly illustrated by the: 
…near chaotic situation that was experienced in the Magistrates Court of this 
city [Pretoria], when Pistorius applied for bail last year. It is common cause 
that during those proceedings the courtroom allocated for the bail proceedings 
was wholly inadequate and could not accommodate all the journalists and 
members of the public who showed up seeking to attend and cover the 
proceedings. It is also common cause that the media attention and coverage 
of the bail proceedings attracted journalists far beyond our borders. Those 
proceedings were in fact extensively covered by the print, broadcast and 
electronic media locally and internationally. The interest in the upcoming trial 
has remained very strong with international media houses sending scores of 
journalists to cover it. This background is relied on as a basis by the applicants 
to assert that it is in the public interest that they be granted permission to cover 
the trial with a view to informing all and sundry about it.57 
Continuing the topic of the pending trial's being a matter of intense public 
interest, the court proceeded to hold: 
I have come to decide to ensure that a greater number of persons in the 
community who have an interest in the matter but who are unable to attend 
these proceedings due to geographical constrains to name just one, are able 
to follow the proceedings wherever they may be. Moreover, in a country like 
ours where democracy is still somewhat young and the perceptions that 
continue to persist in the larger section of South African society, particularly 
those who are poor and who have found it difficult to access the justice 
system, that they should have a first-hand account of the proceedings 
involving a local and international icon.58 
The author respectfully submits that in the above rulings the court 
misdirected itself in its definition of what constitutes the public interest in the 
administration of justice. Instead the court concentrated erroneously on 
factors that either appealed to individual members of the public, that certain 
members of the public may have been curious about, or that certain 
individual members of the public may have had a personal or even a morbid 
interest in - none of which constitutes the true public interest in the 
administration of justice. 
In support of her argument the author argues firstly that the court initially 
considered what was convenient for the public, namely any geographical 
constraints on members of the public to get to the court itself. She argues 
that the physical location of the members of the public, which may prove to 
cause an inconvenience for certain people if they voluntarily desire to go to 
a court, is not representative of the true public interest in the administration 
                                            
56  Application case para 4. 
57  Application case para 5. 
58  Application case para 27. 
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of justice. Secondly, the court held that it is appropriate for people who have 
never previously interacted with the justice system themselves to acquire a 
"first-hand" account of how the system deals with a "local and international 
icon".59 The author submits that again this ruling is not representative of the 
true public interest in the administration of justice. The fact that certain 
individual members of the public may find the trial events personally 
interesting, or that they may be entertained by watching the trial is irrelevant 
when speaking of the true public interest in the administration of justice. 
On a slightly different note but one the author considers to be of the utmost 
importance, although Oscar Pistorius is internationally famous for his 
sporting achievements and overcoming his severe physical disability 
(personal triumphs which presumably justified the "icon" accolade awarded 
by the court) these achievements do not, did not, and could not, place any 
onus on him whatsoever to educate the general public on how South Africa's 
criminal system works. What is fundamental and should not be forgotten by 
all concerned is that as a presumptively innocent accused, Oscar Pistorius 
owed the public absolutely nothing in this matter. 
The court then enigmatically proceeded to take judicial notice of a 
perception, viz: 
I have taken judicial notice of the fact that part of the perception that I allude 
to is the fact that the justice system is still perceived as treating the rich and 
famous with kid gloves whilst being harsh on the poor and vulnerable. 
Enabling a larger South African society to follow first-hand the criminal 
proceedings which involve a celebrity, so to speak, will go a long way into 
dispelling these negative and unfounded perceptions about the justice system, 
and will inform and educate society regarding the conduct of criminal 
proceedings.60 
The court's taking judicial recognition of an intangible perception, let alone 
one that the rich and famous are treated "with kid gloves" whilst the poor 
and vulnerable are treated "harshly", is surprising if not ground-breaking to 
say the least. It is noteworthy that there was a dearth of authority or even a 
submission of a basis upon which the quoted perception qualified for, or 
even warranted, judicial recognition. Having effected such an abnormal 
judicial recognition, however, the court itself proposed a partial solution to 
the problem of how to eradicate or correct this apparent, negative 
perception. The court reasoned that this (now judicially recognised) 
perception would be largely negated if a substantial portion of the public 
                                            
59  Application case para 27. 
60  Application case para 27. 
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was able to view "first-hand" how the system conducts criminal proceedings 
against a celebrity.61 
The author argues that it is not the responsibility of any individual member 
of the public and least of all the responsibility of a presumptively innocent 
accused to correct public perceptions, especially a perception that has not 
been substantiated. Furthermore, and this is important, it is necessary to 
note that the fact that Pistorius is famous, rich and an icon (sporting or 
otherwise) should have been totally irrelevant and of absolutely no 
consequence whatsoever to the court in its consideration of the matter 
before it. The Constitution itself prescriptively mandates that a court must 
apply the law "impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice".62 
In then considering the applicant's argument that it possessed the 
constitutional right to freedom of expression, the court referred to the value 
afforded to this freedom in legal precedent and quoted from the 
Constitutional Court ruling in Khumalo v Holomisa 63 that had stressed the 
following with regard to the role played by the media: 
The print, broadcast and electronic media have a particular role in the 
protection of freedom of expression in our society. Every citizen has the right 
to freedom of the press and the media and the right to receive information and 
ideas. The media are key agents in ensuring that these aspects of the right to 
freedom of information are respected.64 
The court then went on to quote from another judgment of the Constitutional 
Court viz South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 65 to 
wit: 
Freedom of expression lies at the heart of a democracy. It is valuable for many 
reasons, including its instrumental function as a guarantor of democracy, its 
implicit recognition and protection of the moral agency of individuals in our 
society and its facilitation of the search for truth by individuals and society 
generally. The Constitution recognises that individuals in our society need to 
be able to hear, form and express opinions and views freely on a wide range 
of matters.66 
There can be no argument with the sentiments quoted above as a 
generalisation of the media's role, nor can there be any argument with 
the Judge President's subsequent referral to the previously discussed 
                                            
61  Application case para 27. 
62  Constitution s 165(2). 
63  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC). 
64  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 22. 
65  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC). 
66  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) 
para 7. 
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Constitutional Court matter of SABC v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions.67 What can be strenuously argued against, however, is 
that the Judge President did not quote, or even acknowledge, what was 
undoubtedly the most important and the most relevant part of that latter 
Constitutional Court ruling, embodied in paragraph 33 as follows: 
Ordinarily, it will not be in the interests of justice for trial proceedings to be 
subjected to live broadcasts. (Emphasis added). 
Why the Judge President failed to acknowledge this most relevant 
statement of the Constitutional Court and then consider it in the matter 
before him is unknown and worrying. 
The author also submits that in its consideration of the Application case the 
court erred (no doubt inadvertently) by taking a legal finding and applying it 
to a different contextual matter. The Khumalo v Holomisa case concerned 
defamation and the quotation that the Judge President referred to was made 
when the Constitutional Court was denoting the openness of government 
and the media's role in providing information to enable the public to be in a 
position to make political decisions. The Constitutional Court was not talking 
of the media's possible role in the televising of a criminal trial.68 
Similarly, when the Judge President made reference to the South African 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence case, the context of the 
original quotation was in that of: 
… the question whether it is constitutional to prohibit members of the armed 
forces from participating in public protest action and from joining trade 
unions.69 
More pertinently, when O'Reagan J made the statement that the court relied 
upon, she was referring more explicitly to a soldier's right to indulge in 
protest action, thus allowing him (as an individual) the right to freedom of 
expression.70 This context is again a far cry from the consideration of the 
media's right to live televise a full criminal trial. 
In continuing his decision on the application before him, the Judge President 
confirmed that he personally regarded press reports of trial proceedings as 
                                            
67  SABC v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 (CC). 
68  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 22. 
69  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) 
para 1. 
70  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) 
para 7. 
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being "second-hand", and held that if Pistorius' objections to televising 
and/or audio broadcasting of his trial were upheld, 
… it will perpetuate the situation that only a small segment of the community 
is able to be kept informed about what happens in court rooms because of this 
minority's access to tools such as Twitter.71 
The author submits that in addition to the relevance of these comments 
being unclear, the issue whether the court itself views newspaper reports 
as "second-hand" and/or how few people use Twitter had doubtful 
applicability in the matter. If, however, the court intended to reference socio-
economic issues, then the author argues that a presumptively innocent 
accused has no duty to correct or to alleviate such socio-economic issues, 
nor does an accused bear any obligation to be used as an unwilling 
mechanism in addressing such issues. The author similarly has difficulty in 
understanding why the court would regard newspaper reports as "second-
hand", yet brief text messages emanating from media persons via Twitter 
as not "second-hand". 
The court continued its findings by dramatically stating that if Pistorius' 
opposition to the application to widely broadcast/televise his coming trial 
was allowed to prevail, the media's entitlement to freedom of expression 
would be "attenuated" and the principle of open justice would "suffer the 
same fate".72 The court consequently held that Pistorius' objections to his 
trial being photographed and broadcast was contrary to the "open justice" 
principle 73 and supported its view with reference to the Constitutional Court 
matter of S v Mamabolo,74 
… the business of adjudication concerns not only the immediate litigants but 
is a matter of public concern which, for its credibility, is done in the open where 
all can see. Of course this openness seeks to ensure that the citizenry know 
what is happening, such knowledge in turn being a means towards the next 
objective: so that the people can discuss, endorse, criticize, applaud or 
castigate the conduct of their courts. And, ultimately, such free and frank 
debate about judicial proceedings serves more than one vital public purpose. 
Self-evidently such informed and vocal public scrutiny promotes impartiality, 
accessibility and effectiveness, three of the important attributes prescribed for 
the judiciary by the Constitution.75 
This is a further unfortunate example of the Judge President's taking a 
quotation out of context. The Mamabolo matter concerned a charge of 
                                            
71  Application case para 21. 
72  Application case para 18. 
73  Application case para 22. 
74  S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC). 
75  S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) para 29. 
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contempt of court and when making the above statement Kriegler J was 
referring to the difference between the criticisms of an individual judicial 
officer versus criticism of the judiciary – again nothing to do with the 
televising of a criminal trial by the media. Nevertheless, the author agrees 
that the above quotation from Mamabolo does indeed assist in correctly 
explaining the premise of the "open justice" principle. The author suggests, 
however, that what the court hearing the Pistorius application appears not 
to have considered is that the holding of criminal trials is but one element 
and component of an "open justice" system. She submits that in the 
application before it, the court appeared to have taken the holistic principle 
of "open justice" and applied it, in its most expansive sense and 
unfortunately erroneously, to one single criminal trial of a solitary citizen. 
The author also makes the point that at no time had Pistorius sought to 
exclude the public from his trial courtroom, nor had he ever argued against 
the press' historical right to attend a trial to compile textual newspaper 
reports - both of which align with legal proceedings being open to view and 
thus accord with the principle of open justice. It therefore follows that 
Pistorius had never, at any time, attempted to "attenuate" the freedom of 
the press, nor had he ever made any attempt to endanger the open justice 
principle, both of which is precisely what the court held Pistorius did do. The 
author posits that the court appeared to have lost sight of the fact that 
Pistorius' objections to the application focussed on the following pertinent 
factors, namely that the press would be permitted to continuously take 
photographs during the on-going trial proceedings, the possibility that the 
live transmission of the trial would enable pending witnesses to hear/see 
already presented testimony and/or evidence thus providing them with the 
opportunity to manipulate their own testimony, and finally, that televising the 
trial to a world-wide audience would place an undue burden on the defence 
– all of which would jeopardise his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair 
trial. 
In its consideration of the right to a fair trial, the court had no hesitation in 
acknowledging that it was an important matter for consideration,76 but then 
promptly held that the right to a fair trial must be balanced against the right 
to freedom of expression.77 In balancing these rights the court held that: 
                                            
76  Application case para 13. 
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… its point of departure was to ensure that each of the rights asserted find 
proper expression and enjoyment without being unduly limited.78 
To facilitate this intention the court believed that its task entailed that it must: 
… look at each right at stake and permit its enjoyment to achieve the objective 
for which it is asserted.79 
Seeming to have already decided the matter, the court found that "court 
proceedings are in fact public and this objective must be recognised".80 In 
addition, and of major significance, the court also held that the 
Constitution's sections 34 and 35(3)(c) make it very clear that even criminal 
proceedings in this country are to be public.81 
The writer again respectfully submits that in this latter portion of its ruling 
the court very significantly misdirected itself, possibly even being 
instrumental in leading to a flawed ruling. The sections of the Constitution 
that the court referred to contain no such stipulation, nor are they even 
peremptory. Section 35(3)(c) in particular does not mandate that an 
accused must undergo a "public trial", but just simply states that an accused 
person has the exclusive right to have one.82 
4 Conclusion 
In closing, the author submits that when deciding the application to televise 
the Oscar Pistorius trial the court occasionally, and unfortunately very 
significantly, misdirected itself in its considerations and subsequent rulings 
on the constitutional rights of the parties concerned. It is also unfortunate 
that the arguments presented to the court were solely limited to the 
respective parties' constitutional entitlements, thus technically restricting the 
scope of the court's judgment. It is emphasised, however, that matters were 
complicated for the court not only by the overwhelming world media 
attention on the coming trial, making it unique in South Africa's 
jurisprudence and the first of its intense nature to occur under the 
Constitution, but also by the fact that the trial itself was imminent. 
                                            
78  Application case para 19. 
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80  Application case para 22. 
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82  See James Open Court for the distinction between what constitutes a "public trial" 
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Procedure Act 51 of 1997 s 152. 
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The author speculates that had the arguments presented to the court been 
expanded to include the open court versus public trial conundrum,83 had the 
significant misdirections been absent and/or had the court been afforded 
more time for consideration, the resultant judgment may have differed 
appreciably. Regrettably, the court was not afforded these opportunities and 
the application for the television, audio and photographic coverage of the 
trial was granted, albeit subject to detailed conditions. The rest, as they say, 
is history. 
What is interesting is that shortly after the trial of Oscar Pistorius another 
proverbial high-profile criminal trial was due to get underway in South Africa 
– that of Shrien Dewani. Dewani was accused of being complicit in the 
murder of his new bride while they were on honeymoon in Cape Town. 
Dewani left for the United Kingdom shortly after his wife's murder and 
lengthy protracted extradition processes were undertaken to ensure he 
returned to South Africa to stand trial. The pending trial aroused 
considerable world-wide interest and it was highly anticipated that following 
the televising of the Pistorius trial, Dewani's trial would provide a suitable 
sequel. Despite the anticipation, however, Dewani's trial was not broadcast. 
As at the time of finalisation of this article, the trial of accused family 
murderer Henri van Breda is on-going in the Western Cape High Court. 
Although permission to broadcast the trial had been initially granted by 
Judge Siraj Desai,84 a subsequent appeal by both the defence and the 
National Prosecuting Authority has halted the live broadcast. 
It thus remains to be seen whether the televising or other live broadcasting 
of criminal trials becomes an accepted part of South Africa's criminal 
procedure. 
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